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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MURINE ELG, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
BOYD FITZGERALD and VALLEY 
VIEW RIDING STABLES, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
Case No. 
14169 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The Plaintiff-Appellant, Maurine Elg, brought this action to recover 
damages for personal injuries from Defendant-Respondents, Boyd F. Fitzgerald 
and Valley View Riding Stables, and its partners, for their negligence in 
causing Appellant and some 25-30 other people to fall out of a haywagon on 
October 6, 1973, at about 8:00 p.m. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Plaint iff-Appellant appeals to this Court from the decision of 
the trial court in favor of the Defendant-Respondents and against the 
Plaintiff-Appellant, no cause of action. Since the trial court did not 
allow any final argument at the conclusion of the case and because it had 
previously taken under advisenent Defendant-Respondents' Motion for a 
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Directed Verdict, it is not clear as to whether the court found in favor of 
Defendant-Respondents on their Motion or on the trial as a whole. While this 
would make a difference in the manner in which the court must construe the 
evidence, it nonetheless found in favor of the Defendant-Respondents. . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks reversal of the decision of the trial court 
and a ranand to the district court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the night of October 6, 1973, the Appellant, Maurine Elg, severely 
and permanently injured her left leg when she and about 30 other people were 
caused to fall out of a wagon while they were on a hayride. 
The dispute between the parties centers around what caused the people 
to fall out of the haywagon. 
On the one hand, the Appellant contends that the manner in which this 
accident occurred requires the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquiti 
an expression which literally translated means "the thing speaks for itself." 
The Appellant further contends that the Respondent was negligent. The Appel-
lant and seven other witnesses, who were all on the haywagon, testified that 
the haywagon went down an incline and as it got toward the bottom it started 
to turn to get onto a road and during the turn either went over a bump or hit 
something which caused one of the wheels to drop and the wagon to tip, thus 
shifting the weight of the people in the wagon and causing a railing against 
which some of the people were leaning to break and all the people to slide 
downward and fall out of the wagon onto the road. (Tr« 53-55; 78; 97; 98; 
108-109; 123; 127-129; 136-138; 142-144; 145-149; 150-152; 154-157; 158; 159) 
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On the other hand, the Respondents contend that the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur is not applicable to this case and that it is not the law in 
the State of Utah. The Respondents further contend that the driver of the 
haywagon was not negligent. The driver testified that he went down, the 
incline and made the turn at the bottom onto the road. Then, all of a 
sudden, about 30 yards after the turn and while the wagon was on a flat, 
level road, traveling about two miles per hour, the people on the haywagon 
started falling out in some mysterious way. (Tr. 134: 8-25) 
The haywagon was 18 feet long, about 8 feet wide and the bed was 
almost 4 feet off of the ground and had a railing around it for people to 
lean against. (Tr. 172: 26-30; 173: 16-20; 18; 52: 4-10; 82:2-3; 105:28) 
According to Ronald Burke, who observed the haywagon and the railing immedi-
ately after the accident, the railing "looked like bamboo11 and was f'about 
1/2 inch in circumference11 and there were two of them extending around the 
bed. (Tr. 85: 28-30; 86:1-29) However, according to Duane Day, the driver 
of the wagon, the railing consisted of a pine pole about 3 1/2 inches in 
circumference and there was only one extending around the bed. (Tr. 173: 
24-25; 179: 21-23) 
The driver of the wagon was able to observe the people get onto the 
haywagon and from where he was seated, he could see where the people were 
situating thanselves, merely by turning around. (Tr. 82: 13-15; 131: 3-10) 
Some of the people, about 8-10 on each side (Tr. 162: 27-30; 163: 1), situ-
ated thanselves around the outside of the haywagon with their backs against 
the railing for support and their knees up against their chests. The other 
people situated thanselves in the middle of the haywagon with their backs 
against each other for support and their knees up against their chests. 
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(Tr, 53: 7-12) All were seated prior to starting and all remained seated 
up to the time of the accident, with the possible exception of a guitar 
player, who may have been standing immediately behind the driver. (Tr. 53: 
13-16; 82: 26-30; 97: 2-3, 8-10; 131: 11-14; 138: 12-14; 150: 27-29; 154: 
6-12; 157: 29-30; 158: 1-8; 159: 8-11; 175: 1-4; 182: 23-25; 187: 30; 188: 1) 
The driver gave no instructions or warnings to any of the people prior 
to starting. (Tr. 53: 17-18; 81: 25-27; 83: 3-5; 96: 15-17, 28-30) He felt 
it was safe to start (Tr. 132: 1-3, 19-21) and he felt the way the people 
were situated and the way some 8-10 people on each side were leaning against 
the railing as a support was also safe. (Tr. 181: 29-30; 182: 1-7) The driv< 
testified that the people did not do anything from the time he started the 
hayride up to the time of the accident which caused him any concern nor did 
anything happen which caused him to say anything to any of the people prior t< 
the accident. (It. 182: 8-22) A short time prior to the accident, Rodney El{ 
and several other people felt that because of the way the haywagon was 
bouncing around that it was going too fast and so he and a couple of other 
people yelled at the driver to f,slow down.*1 At least four other witnesses 
confirmed his testimony. (Tr. 54: 5-8; 97: 18-26; 137: 18-21; 151: 15-17; 
155: 8-12) The entire ride only lasted about 1 1/2-2 minutes and the haywaga 
only went about 200-250 feet prior to the accident. (Tr. 175: 4-7; 182: 13-1 
The driver- of the wagon, Duane Day, was a 1/3 owner and Boyd Fitzgeral 
the Respondent, was a 2/3 owner of Valley View Riding Stables, a partnership, 
which had contracted with Ronald Burke of the Midvale Eagles to take the 
people on the hayride for about $30.00 or $1.00 per person. (Tic. 130: 11-20; 
161: 6-10; 171: 23-25) The Appellant, Maurine Elg, and her husband, Rodney 
Elg, had purchased a ticket for the hayride. (Ex. P. 2) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS PREROGATIVES BY REFUSING TO ACCEPT UNCOtOTROVERTED 
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE At© IGNORING AND MISAPPLYING PROVEN FACTS AND ESTABLISHED 
IAW, TO WIT: THE DOCTRH^E OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR. 
Prior to the conxnencenent of trial, the court, in chambers, advised 
counsel that, based upon the Complaint, he could not see where the Respondent 
was negligent and that he would not apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
to this case since he did not believe that it was still the law in the State 
of Utah. Although such conference was not recorded, such facts were borne 
out in counsel for the Respondent's argument on his Motion to Dismiss at the 
conclusion of Appellantfs case wherein he stated the following: 
11
 . . . We admit it was an unfortunate accident, 
but res ipsa doesn't apply in this instance. The 
plaintiff has proved nothing except res ipsa . . . ." 
The reason counsel said res ipsa did not apply is because that is what the 
court stated prior to trial. It is also interesting to note that counsel 
admitted that the Appellant did prove and establish a case of res ipsa loquiti 
against the Respondent. 
Although Appellant's evidence established a prima facie case of negli-
gence, the court refused to accept the uncontroverted credible evidence and 
chose to ignore and refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, 
apparently believing that it no longer exists in the State of Utah.. 
That the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is alive and well in the State 
of Utah is an established fact, notwithstanding the opinion of the court to 
the contrary. The doctrine has most recently been recognized and applied by 
the Utah Suprene Court in the following cases: Talbot y. Dr. W. H. Groves' 
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Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 440 P. 2d 872, 21 Utah 2d 73 (1968); Sanone v. 
J. C. Penney Company, 404 P. 2d 248, 17 Utah 2d 46 (1965); Joseph v. W. H. 
Groves1 Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 348 P. 2d 935, 10 Utah 2d 94 (1960); 
Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 351 P. 2d 952, 10 Utah 2d 276 (1960); 
Wightman v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 302 P. 2d 471, 5 Utah 2d 373 (1956); 
Hayward v. Downing, 189 P. 2d 442, (Sup. Ct. of Utah, 1948); and Paul v. Salt 
Lake City R. Co., 83 P. 563 (Sup. Ct. of Utah, 1905). 
In the Joseph case, supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
1
'The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur springs from the 
very practical process of drawing logical conclusions 
from circumstantial evidence. Its purpose is to permit 
one who suffers injury from something under the control 
of another, which ordinarily would not cause the injury 
except for the other's negligence, to present his grie-
vance to a court or jury on the basis of the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from such facts, even though he 
may be unable to present direct evidence of the other's 
negligence." 
In the Lund case, supra, where the defendant argued that even if it wai 
assumed that a substance or instrumentality over which it had control had. 
caused damage to plaintiff, there was no evidence of negligence on its part, 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"This argument practically ignores the purpose of the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, namely, to permit one 
who suffers injury from something under the control of 
another, which ordinarily would not cause the injury 
except for the other's negligence, to present his grie-
vance to a court or jury on the basis of the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from such facts; and cast the 
burden upon the other to make proof of what happened." 
(Emphasis added) 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applied and received a thorough 
analysis in the case of Shay v. Parkhurst, 229 P. 2d 510 (Sup. Ct. Wash., 
1951), where one of four passengers in a taxi cab was caused to fall out when 
a door opened while the taxi cab was rounding a curve at a reasonable speed. 
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The court stated: 
"We know frcm coamon observation and experience that 
taxicab doors do not fly open while rounding a curve 
at a reasonable speed if those who have control of 
the doors have used proper care.11 
The court shifted the burden of proof to the driver of the taxi cab to explain 
how the door happened to open. The court stated the law as follows: 
"The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, an expression 
which literally translated means 'the thing speaks 
for itself,' as applied in this state and most juris-
dictions is as follows: When the agency or instrumen-
tality which caused the injury complained of is shown 
to have been under the exclusive control and managenent 
of the defendant or his servants, and the accident, or 
injurious occurrence, is such as in the ordinary course 
of events does not happen if those who have the control 
and management of the agency or instrumentality use 
proper care, the injurious occurrence of itself, in the 
absence of explanation by the defendant, affords reason-
able evidence, or a permissible inference, that such 
occurrence arose from or was caused by the defendant's 
want of care. * * * 
"This, doctrine constitutes a rule of evidence peculiar 
to the law of negligence and is an exception to, or 
perhaps more accurately a qualification of, the general 
rule that negligence is not to be presumed, but must be 
affirmatively proved. By virtue of the doctrine, the 
law recognizes that an accident, or injurious occurrence, 
may be of such nature, or may happen under such circum-
stances, that the occurrence is of itself sufficient to 
establish prima facie the fact of negligence on the part 
of the defendant, without further or direct proof thereof, 
thus casting upon the defendant the duty to cone forward 
with an exculpatory explanation, rebutting or otherwise 
overcoming the presumption or inference of negligence on 
his part." 
If the court in the subject case had considered the incontroverted 
credible evidence in light of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which it 
obviously failed to do, the court would have come to the following conclusions 
1. The Appellant suffered an injury when she was caused to fall 
out of Respondent's haywagon. 
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2c The haywagon was under the exclusive control of the driver, 
Whose negligence would be imputed to the Respondent. 
3. Ordinarily, one would not expect to fall out of a haywagon and 
be injured in going on a liayride except for the negligence of the driver. 
4. None of the people in the haywagon were negligent. In this 
regard, the driver of the haywagon testified as follows: 
Q (By Mr. Morgan) But you knew based on the other 
hayrides you had taken that it was normal for people 
to sit with their backs against the railing and use 
the railing for support? 
A They sat — yes. Previously they sat with their 
backs against the railing. 
Q And they used the railing for support, correct, 
to lean against? 
A To lean against, 
Q And this is what they had done on prior occasions, 
and based on the way they were seated on this occasion on 
October 6, based on what you observed before you started, 
they were situated on both sides with their backs against 
the railing, were they not? 
A Yes, and down the center. 
Q And you figured that railing was safe for than to 
lean against, did you not? 
A Yes. I felt that it was safe to lean against. 
Q And you didn't give than any warning that it was 
not safe to sit the way they were seated? 
A Oh, no. No, sir. 
Q And you knew they were sitting there with their 
backs against the railing using the railing as support, 
correct? 
A Yes. I felt the railing was safe in normal use.. 
Q O.K. Now, did anything happen from the time that 
you started on this trip to the time of the accident that 
caused you to say anything to anyone of the rneribers of 
that hayride on October 6, 1973? 
A No. 
Q Nothing happened during that entire time until — 
well, until somebody advised you that they had fallen off 
and there was an accident and you stopped the rig? 
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A Yeah. The entire time was possibly a minute and 
a half or two minutes. 
Q O.K. And nothing happened during that minute or 
minute and a half while you traversed the distance you 
did to cause you any concern as far as what those people 
were doing; is that correct? 
A Thatfs correct. At that point I am looking ahead. 
Q And as far as you know they were all seated and 
not one was standing up other than maybe this guitar 
player? 
A As far as I know, yes. 
Q And you knew as well, did you not, that based on 
your past experience in taking hayrides that it was not 
unusual to go over a bump in the road? 
A No. It is not unusual at all . ..  . . 
* * * • * 
Q O.K. But it was not unusual for the haywagon to 
hit a bump, correct? 
A Correct. 
Q And if it hit a bump, it was not unusual for the 
people who were leaning against the railing to. lean against 
the railing, was it? 
A I imagine not, not that I can see. They are already 
leaning against it. 
Q And if it was not unusual to hit a bump and have 
the people lean against the railing, you felt that railing 
was strong enough to support the people leaning against 
it even if you hit a bump? 
A That's correct. 
Q But in fact apparently it was not strong enough on 
this occasion to keep the people from falling out of the 
wagon and it breaking? 
A The railing broke. As to why it broke, I don't 
know. But it was evidently not strong enough to take 
whatever happened to it. 
5. The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the above facts is 
that the driver of the haywagon was negligent in doing something which caused 
the Appellant and some 30 other people to fall out of his haywagon,, 
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6. The burden of proof as to what happened and to prove that he 
was not negligent should shift to the driver of the haywagon. 
7. The driver of the haywagon offered no credible evidence as to 
what happened to cause the people to fall out of his haywagon. His only 
explanation was that he was going down a level road and "all of a sudden 
people started to fall off11 of his haywagon. (Tr. 134: 18-22) Thus, the 
driver failed to meet his burden of proving that he was not negligent in 
causing the people to fall off of his haywagon. 
In the Hayward case, supra, where a patron of a wrestling match at 
the State Fair Grounds in. Salt Lake City was injured when a blcjacher seat 
on which he was sitting collapsed, the Utah Supreme Court found as follows: 
* Defendants further contend that even though 
plaintiffs were irtvitees, the judgment ought to 
be affirmed because there was no showing of negli-
gence on the part of defendant. With this con-
tention we cannot agree. Defendants having 
permitted plaintiffs to sit upon the platform, 
they were bound to exercise ordinary care to main-
tain it in a safe condition for the accoraniodation 
of spectators invited to sit there , . . , Fran 
the fact that the platform collapsed, and that it 
was in the exclusive possession and control of the 
defendants, it may be inferred that the defendants 
failed to exercise reasonable care to keep the 
platform in safe condition for the seating of spec-
tators. Reversed and remanded for new trial. Costs 
to appellants." 
The above case is strikingly similar to the case at bar, where the 
Respondent also contends that there was no showing of negligence. Neverthe-
less, as in the above case, since the Respondent permitted the Appellant and 
the other 30 people to sit in the haywagon and for 8-10 people on each side 
to lean against the railing for support, the Respondent was bound to exercis 
at least, ordinary care to maintain the railing in a safe condition for the 
accommodation of the riders invited to use it for support. Also, from the 
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fact that the railing broke, causing people to fall out of the haywagon 
onto the road and that it was in the exclusive control of the Respondent, 
it may be inferred that the Respondent failed to exercise reasonable care 
to keep the railing in safe condition for the use of the people going on 
the hayride. Therefore, as in the above case, the Suprane Court should 
reverse the decision of the district court and remand the same for a new 
trial. 
Another interesting case is Sanone v. J. C. Penney Company, supra, 
where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was held applicable when a child 
suffered injuries on defendant's escalator since it was under the exclusive 
control of the defendant. The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"It is common knowledge that escalators are widely 
used in public buildings, particularly in department 
stores, and that thousands of people, including 
children, use than daily without injury. It is cer-
tainly not unreasonable for one to assume that it is 
safe to use than in the manner and for the purpose 
for which they were intended. Nor does it depart 
from reason to draw the inference that if an escala-
tor is so used and an injury occurs there was some-
thing wrong in either the construction, maintenance, 
or operation of the escalator.11 
In the case at bar, the Appellant submits that it is cannon knowledge 
that people do not ordinarily subject themselves to the possibility of serious 
injury by sinply going on a hayride. It is certainly not unreasonable for one 
to assume that the haywagon is safe for than to use in the manner and for the 
purpose for which it was intended. It is also certainly not unreasonable to 
draw the inference that if the haywagon is so used and someone is injured, 
such as the Appellant, then either there was something wrong in the way the 
driver operated the haywagon in that he dumped all of his passenger's out of tt 
haywagon and onto the road or there was something wrong with the construction 
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or maintenance of the haywagon, especially as it related to the railing 
around the haywagon which broke. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT APPELLANT PROVED AND ESTAB-
LISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF NEGLIGENCE AGAINST RESPONDENT AND IN FAILING 
TO SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE RESPONDENT TO SHOW THAI THE DRIVER OF 
THE HAYWAGON WAS NOT NEGLIGENT. 
The Appellant proved and established that the driver of the haywagon 
either was traveling too fast, made too sharp a turn or hit a bump or sane-
thing else \falch. caused the haywagon to tip, thus shifting the weight of the 
people and putting greater pressure on the railing against which seme people 
were leaning for support which caused the railing to break and all the people 
to slide downward and fall out of the wagon onto the road. In this regard, 
the witnesses testified as follows: 
1. Dennis Brown stated: 
11
 It was going down the incline and as it got toward 
the bottom it started to turn to get on the road. 
And it either went over a bump or the wheel dropped, 
and the wagon tipped quite a bit and thatf s when the 
rail broke and people along the rail fell out and most 
of the people in the center, just from the angle, slid 
out and it straightened up after it slid out. And I 
yelled a couple of times, at the driver to stop after 
they had all fallen out. And he stopped.11 (Tr. 154: 
27-30; 155: 1-4) 
2. Sandra Burke stated: 
11
 * . . And when we were turning to get on the road 
it raised one side, or lowered one side. All the 
weight shifted as the straw slid and the rail gave 
way and we went out. And we went out onto the road." 
(Tr. 158: 12-16) 
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3. Hugh Brown stated: 
11
 . . . The wagon started and I just ronoriber 
bouncing around. It was kind of rough. And it 
seems to me like we hit kind of an angle or sane-
thing, but it felt like the weight shifted on the 
wagon and the rail broke and I went out backwards." 
(Tr. 146: 19-23) 
4. The Appellant, Maurine Elg, stated: 
"It seemed like it was kind of went into a bump or 
something, a hole or something. It kind of seaned 
to go down and then it tipped up and the railing 
broke." (Tr. 78: 26-28) 
5. Barbara Brown stated: 
11
 . . . we got on the wagon and we was all crowded 
in and I felt like we was going over a clearing and 
then starting down an incline. And then I don't 
know what we hit, but it felt like the wagon went 
up on one side and I had the feeling when I fell off 
the wagon was coming over on top of me. ..." (Tr. 
. 151: 5-10) 
6. Rodney Elg stated: 
" . . . As it was going down the hill and it made 
the turn onto the road I think thatfs what made it 
tip to throw the weight against the railing." (Tr. 
123: 5-7) 
7. Card. Brown stated: 
"And the wagon sort of tipped when we went down the 
hill. The weight sort of shifted to the one side." 
(Tr. 143: 28-29) 
8. Gilbert Burke stated: 
" . . . I do remember going down the hill and then 
making the turn and the rail broke." (Tr. 159: 15-16) 
9. All of the above witnesses also stated that because of the way 
the haywagon was bouncing around that it was going too fast and that they 
each heard someone yell at the driver to "slow down." (Tr. 54: 5-8; 97: 
18-26; 137: 18-21; 151: 15-17; 155: 8-12) In this regard, Rodney Elg testi-
fied as follows: 
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"Well, we started going down the hill and seemed to 
be bouncing around a lot. And how fast we was going, 
I do not know. But it seemed like it was going too 
fast. 
It was bouncing, so I know I yelled and a couple 
of other people yelled to slow down. I wouldn't say 
that the horses were running, but it was just kind of 
bouncing around on the road.11 (Tr. 97: 20-26) 
The Court's comment on the above evidence concerning a request or plea 
by the riders for the driver to "slow down", which certainly indicates a 
real concern on the ridersv part for their safety, was as follows: 
"THE COURT: What evidence is there in the record of 
any speed? 
MR. MORGAN: Well, Your Honor, we are not talking about 
a speed in excess of the speed limit. 
THE COURT: Other than some unknown person, some of 
the witnesses thought they heard sane unknown person 
say, 'Slow down.' He may want to be getting off." 
(Tr. 167: 10-16) 
The above comment is indicative of the fact that the court had already 
made its decision on this case against the Appellant prior to trial and that 
it had failed to listen carefully to the evidence offered by the Appellant to 
prove her prima facie case of negligence against the Respondent,, 
This opinion is further evidenced by the fact that the court, after 
the parties had rested, did not want to hear nor did he even allow counsel 
for Appellant to argue his case as to the law or as to the damages suffered 
by the Appellant. The court merely assumed that Appellant's argument would 
be the same as presented in response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. (Tr. 
195: 25-30; 196: 1-6) 
Such unfairness is tantamount to an abuse of process and resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice. 
The only evidence offered by the Respondent as an explanation as to 
what happened was that of Eva Gains, who was a close personal friend of both 
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the driver of the haywagon and the Respondent. (Tr. 193: 29-30; 194: 1-6) 
She was seated next to the driver, whom she had worked for before. She 
testified that the guitarist, who was standing up behind her, lost M s 
balance and fell into a group of people and then they all started falling 
off the wagon. (Tr. 189: 11-26; 192: 1-3) 
On cross-examination, Mr. Gains testified as follows: 
Q (By Mr. Morgan) This one man lost his balance 
and started to fall off the wagon and is that what 
you believe caused everybody else to fall off the wagon? 
A I cannot say that. I just know he fell off and 
everybody started falling off. 
Q Was the wagon that unstable that if one man lost 
his balance that it would cause everybody else to fall 
to one side and fall off? 
A I couldn't make that kind of a statement, no, sir. 
Q Certainly one man falling wouldn't have any effect 
on the wagon, would it? 
A I'd say so, if you fell into a bunch of people 
with the pressure. I would say it would. 
' • ' * * * * 
Q And what happened when he fell into those people? 
A The next thing I knew they was all falling off. 
It is submitted that if the haywagon was so unstable that if one man 
lost his balance and fell that it would cause everyone else to fall off of 
the haywagon that the Respondent was negligent in inviting people to use his 
haywagon for a hayride when it was not safe to be used for such a purpose. 
It is also submitted that if there was sane danger in allowing the man to 
stand that the driver of the haywagon, who was sitting almost next to the 
man, had a duty to warn him of the instability of the haywagon and the reason-
able consequences of what might foreseeably happen if he fell. No such warnin; 
was given. (Tr. 193: 14-29) 
The Appellant established a prima facie case of negligence against the 
Respondent and the Respondent failed to offer a satisfactory explanation as to 
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what happened to rebut such proof and inference of negligence. Thus, the 
court should have found that Respondent failed to meet his burden of proof 
and ruled in favor of the Appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above facts and law, it is respectfully submitted that 
the decision of the district court should be reversed and the case rananded 
for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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